Daily Papers

The performance of acquisition functions for Bayesian optimisation to locate the global optimum of continuous functions is investigated in terms of the Pareto front between exploration and exploitation. We show that Expected Improvement (EI) and the Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) always select solutions to be expensively evaluated on the Pareto front, but Probability of Improvement is not guaranteed to do so and Weighted Expected Improvement does so only for a restricted range of weights. We introduce two novel epsilon-greedy acquisition functions. Extensive empirical evaluation of these together with random search, purely exploratory, and purely exploitative search on 10 benchmark problems in 1 to 10 dimensions shows that epsilon-greedy algorithms are generally at least as effective as conventional acquisition functions (e.g., EI and UCB), particularly with a limited budget. In higher dimensions epsilon-greedy approaches are shown to have improved performance over conventional approaches. These results are borne out on a real world computational fluid dynamics optimisation problem and a robotics active learning problem. Our analysis and experiments suggest that the most effective strategy, particularly in higher dimensions, is to be mostly greedy, occasionally selecting a random exploratory solution.

Bayesian optimisation is a popular, surrogate model-based approach for optimising expensive black-box functions. Given a surrogate model, the next location to expensively evaluate is chosen via maximisation of a cheap-to-query acquisition function. We present an epsilon-greedy procedure for Bayesian optimisation in batch settings in which the black-box function can be evaluated multiple times in parallel. Our epsilon-shotgun algorithm leverages the model's prediction, uncertainty, and the approximated rate of change of the landscape to determine the spread of batch solutions to be distributed around a putative location. The initial target location is selected either in an exploitative fashion on the mean prediction, or -- with probability epsilon -- from elsewhere in the design space. This results in locations that are more densely sampled in regions where the function is changing rapidly and in locations predicted to be good (i.e close to predicted optima), with more scattered samples in regions where the function is flatter and/or of poorer quality. We empirically evaluate the epsilon-shotgun methods on a range of synthetic functions and two real-world problems, finding that they perform at least as well as state-of-the-art batch methods and in many cases exceed their performance.

This paper investigates a novel lossy compression framework operating under logarithmic loss, designed to handle situations where the reconstruction distribution diverges from the source distribution. This framework is especially relevant for applications that require joint compression and retrieval, and in scenarios involving distributional shifts due to processing. We show that the proposed formulation extends the classical minimum entropy coupling framework by integrating a bottleneck, allowing for a controlled degree of stochasticity in the coupling. We explore the decomposition of the Minimum Entropy Coupling with Bottleneck (MEC-B) into two distinct optimization problems: Entropy-Bounded Information Maximization (EBIM) for the encoder, and Minimum Entropy Coupling (MEC) for the decoder. Through extensive analysis, we provide a greedy algorithm for EBIM with guaranteed performance, and characterize the optimal solution near functional mappings, yielding significant theoretical insights into the structural complexity of this problem. Furthermore, we illustrate the practical application of MEC-B through experiments in Markov Coding Games (MCGs) under rate limits. These games simulate a communication scenario within a Markov Decision Process, where an agent must transmit a compressed message from a sender to a receiver through its actions. Our experiments highlight the trade-offs between MDP rewards and receiver accuracy across various compression rates, showcasing the efficacy of our method compared to conventional compression baseline.

Batch Bayesian optimisation (BO) is a successful technique for the optimisation of expensive black-box functions. Asynchronous BO can reduce wallclock time by starting a new evaluation as soon as another finishes, thus maximising resource utilisation. To maximise resource allocation, we develop a novel asynchronous BO method, AEGiS (Asynchronous epsilon-Greedy Global Search) that combines greedy search, exploiting the surrogate's mean prediction, with Thompson sampling and random selection from the approximate Pareto set describing the trade-off between exploitation (surrogate mean prediction) and exploration (surrogate posterior variance). We demonstrate empirically the efficacy of AEGiS on synthetic benchmark problems, meta-surrogate hyperparameter tuning problems and real-world problems, showing that AEGiS generally outperforms existing methods for asynchronous BO. When a single worker is available performance is no worse than BO using expected improvement.

Stochastic optimization is one of the central problems in Machine Learning and Theoretical Computer Science. In the standard model, the algorithm is given a fixed distribution known in advance. In practice though, one may acquire at a cost extra information to make better decisions. In this paper, we study how to buy information for stochastic optimization and formulate this question as an online learning problem. Assuming the learner has an oracle for the original optimization problem, we design a 2-competitive deterministic algorithm and a e/(e-1)-competitive randomized algorithm for buying information. We show that this ratio is tight as the problem is equivalent to a robust generalization of the ski-rental problem, which we call super-martingale stopping. We also consider an adaptive setting where the learner can choose to buy information after taking some actions for the underlying optimization problem. We focus on the classic optimization problem, Min-Sum Set Cover, where the goal is to quickly find an action that covers a given request drawn from a known distribution. We provide an 8-competitive algorithm running in polynomial time that chooses actions and decides when to buy information about the underlying request.

Sequence models are a critical component of modern NLP systems, but their predictions are difficult to explain. We consider model explanations though rationales, subsets of context that can explain individual model predictions. We find sequential rationales by solving a combinatorial optimization: the best rationale is the smallest subset of input tokens that would predict the same output as the full sequence. Enumerating all subsets is intractable, so we propose an efficient greedy algorithm to approximate this objective. The algorithm, which is called greedy rationalization, applies to any model. For this approach to be effective, the model should form compatible conditional distributions when making predictions on incomplete subsets of the context. This condition can be enforced with a short fine-tuning step. We study greedy rationalization on language modeling and machine translation. Compared to existing baselines, greedy rationalization is best at optimizing the combinatorial objective and provides the most faithful rationales. On a new dataset of annotated sequential rationales, greedy rationales are most similar to human rationales.

Influence maximization (IM) aims to identify a small number of influential individuals to maximize the information spread and finds applications in various fields. It was first introduced in the context of viral marketing, where a company pays a few influencers to promote the product. However, apart from the cost factor, the capacity of individuals to consume content poses challenges for implementing IM in real-world scenarios. For example, players on online gaming platforms can only interact with a limited number of friends. In addition, we observe that in these scenarios, (i) the initial adopters of promotion are likely to be the friends of influencers rather than the influencers themselves, and (ii) existing IM solutions produce sub-par results with high computational demands. Motivated by these observations, we propose a new IM variant called capacity constrained influence maximization (CIM), which aims to select a limited number of influential friends for each initial adopter such that the promotion can reach more users. To solve CIM effectively, we design two greedy algorithms, MG-Greedy and RR-Greedy, ensuring the 1/2-approximation ratio. To improve the efficiency, we devise the scalable implementation named RR-OPIM+ with (1/2-epsilon)-approximation and near-linear running time. We extensively evaluate the performance of 9 approaches on 6 real-world networks, and our solutions outperform all competitors in terms of result quality and running time. Additionally, we deploy RR-OPIM+ to online game scenarios, which improves the baseline considerably.

Greedy search methods like Greedy Best-First Search (GBFS) and Enforced Hill-Climbing (EHC) often struggle when faced with Uninformed Heuristic Regions (UHRs) like heuristic local minima or plateaus. In this work, we theoretically and empirically compare two popular methods for escaping UHRs in breadth-first search (BrFS) and restarting random walks (RRWs). We first derive the expected runtime of escaping a UHR using BrFS and RRWs, based on properties of the UHR and the random walk procedure, and then use these results to identify when RRWs will be faster in expectation than BrFS. We then evaluate these methods for escaping UHRs by comparing standard EHC, which uses BrFS to escape UHRs, to variants of EHC called EHC-RRW, which use RRWs for that purpose. EHC-RRW is shown to have strong expected runtime guarantees in cases where EHC has previously been shown to be effective. We also run experiments with these approaches on PDDL planning benchmarks to better understand their relative effectiveness for escaping UHRs.

Top-k decoding is a widely used method for sampling from LLMs: at each token, only the largest k next-token-probabilities are kept, and the next token is sampled after re-normalizing them to sum to unity. Top-k and other sampling methods are motivated by the intuition that true next-token distributions are sparse, and the noisy LLM probabilities need to be truncated. However, to our knowledge, a precise theoretical motivation for the use of top-k decoding is missing. In this work, we develop a theoretical framework that both explains and generalizes top-k decoding. We view decoding at a fixed token as the recovery of a sparse probability distribution. We consider Bregman decoders obtained by minimizing a separable Bregman divergence (for both the primal and dual cases) with a sparsity-inducing ell_0 regularization. Despite the combinatorial nature of the objective, we show how to optimize it efficiently for a large class of divergences. We show that the optimal decoding strategies are greedy, and further that the loss function is discretely convex in k, so that binary search provably and efficiently finds the optimal k. We show that top-k decoding arises as a special case for the KL divergence, and identify new decoding strategies that have distinct behaviors (e.g., non-linearly up-weighting larger probabilities after re-normalization).

In reinforcement learning (RL), rewards of states are typically considered additive, and following the Markov assumption, they are independent of states visited previously. In many important applications, such as coverage control, experiment design and informative path planning, rewards naturally have diminishing returns, i.e., their value decreases in light of similar states visited previously. To tackle this, we propose submodular RL (SubRL), a paradigm which seeks to optimize more general, non-additive (and history-dependent) rewards modelled via submodular set functions which capture diminishing returns. Unfortunately, in general, even in tabular settings, we show that the resulting optimization problem is hard to approximate. On the other hand, motivated by the success of greedy algorithms in classical submodular optimization, we propose SubPO, a simple policy gradient-based algorithm for SubRL that handles non-additive rewards by greedily maximizing marginal gains. Indeed, under some assumptions on the underlying Markov Decision Process (MDP), SubPO recovers optimal constant factor approximations of submodular bandits. Moreover, we derive a natural policy gradient approach for locally optimizing SubRL instances even in large state- and action- spaces. We showcase the versatility of our approach by applying SubPO to several applications, such as biodiversity monitoring, Bayesian experiment design, informative path planning, and coverage maximization. Our results demonstrate sample efficiency, as well as scalability to high-dimensional state-action spaces.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

Feature selection helps reduce data acquisition costs in ML, but the standard approach is to train models with static feature subsets. Here, we consider the dynamic feature selection (DFS) problem where a model sequentially queries features based on the presently available information. DFS is often addressed with reinforcement learning, but we explore a simpler approach of greedily selecting features based on their conditional mutual information. This method is theoretically appealing but requires oracle access to the data distribution, so we develop a learning approach based on amortized optimization. The proposed method is shown to recover the greedy policy when trained to optimality, and it outperforms numerous existing feature selection methods in our experiments, thus validating it as a simple but powerful approach for this problem.

Evaluating modern machine learning models has become prohibitively expensive. Benchmarks such as LMMs-Eval and HELM demand thousands of GPU hours per model. Costly evaluation reduces inclusivity, slows the cycle of innovation, and worsens environmental impact. The typical approach follows two steps. First, select an anchor subset of data. Second, train a mapping from the accuracy on this subset to the final test result. The drawback is that anchor selection depends on clustering, which can be complex and sensitive to design choices. We argue that promoting diversity among samples is not essential; what matters is to select samples that maximise diversity in model responses. Our method, Diversifying Sample Condensation (DISCO), selects the top-k samples with the greatest model disagreements. This uses greedy, sample-wise statistics rather than global clustering. The approach is conceptually simpler. From a theoretical view, inter-model disagreement provides an information-theoretically optimal rule for such greedy selection. DISCO shows empirical gains over prior methods, achieving state-of-the-art results in performance prediction across MMLU, Hellaswag, Winogrande, and ARC. Code is available here: https://github.com/arubique/disco-public.

A major technique in learning-augmented online algorithms is combining multiple algorithms or predictors. Since the performance of each predictor may vary over time, it is desirable to use not the single best predictor as a benchmark, but rather a dynamic combination which follows different predictors at different times. We design algorithms that combine predictions and are competitive against such dynamic combinations for a wide class of online problems, namely, metrical task systems. Against the best (in hindsight) unconstrained combination of ell predictors, we obtain a competitive ratio of O(ell^2), and show that this is best possible. However, for a benchmark with slightly constrained number of switches between different predictors, we can get a (1+epsilon)-competitive algorithm. Moreover, our algorithms can be adapted to access predictors in a bandit-like fashion, querying only one predictor at a time. An unexpected implication of one of our lower bounds is a new structural insight about covering formulations for the k-server problem.

In the context of multi-step reasoning, language models (LMs) probabilities are often miscalibrated -- solutions with high probabilities are not always correct. Therefore, greedy decoding, which is the standard decoding method for reasoning tasks, often yields incorrect solutions. In addition, methods such as self-consistency and verifiers rely on sampling from the LM distribution and do not tackle the underlying issue. To address this, we introduce Guiding Multi-step ReAsoning with a CorrectnEss Discriminator (GRACE), a stepwise decoding approach that nudges the model towards producing correct reasoning steps. GRACE employs a discriminator model, which is trained to differentiate correct steps from invalid ones, to adjust decoding preferences based on the correctness of each reasoning step. Importantly, GRACE does not require fine-tuning or re-training the LMs. When compared with conventional decoding strategies over four popular math reasoning benchmarks, GRACE exhibits significant improvements in both final answer accuracy and step correctness, outperforming both greedy decoding and self-consistency.Our code can be found at \url{https://github.com/mukhal/grace.}

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Multitask Reinforcement Learning (MTRL) approaches have gained increasing attention for its wide applications in many important Reinforcement Learning (RL) tasks. However, while recent advancements in MTRL theory have focused on the improved statistical efficiency by assuming a shared structure across tasks, exploration--a crucial aspect of RL--has been largely overlooked. This paper addresses this gap by showing that when an agent is trained on a sufficiently diverse set of tasks, a generic policy-sharing algorithm with myopic exploration design like epsilon-greedy that are inefficient in general can be sample-efficient for MTRL. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first theoretical demonstration of the "exploration benefits" of MTRL. It may also shed light on the enigmatic success of the wide applications of myopic exploration in practice. To validate the role of diversity, we conduct experiments on synthetic robotic control environments, where the diverse task set aligns with the task selection by automatic curriculum learning, which is empirically shown to improve sample-efficiency.

The Multi-armed bandit offer the advantage to learn and exploit the already learnt knowledge at the same time. This capability allows this approach to be applied in different domains, going from clinical trials where the goal is investigating the effects of different experimental treatments while minimizing patient losses, to adaptive routing where the goal is to minimize the delays in a network. This article provides a review of the recent results on applying bandit to real-life scenario and summarize the state of the art for each of these fields. Different techniques has been proposed to solve this problem setting, like epsilon-greedy, Upper confident bound (UCB) and Thompson Sampling (TS). We are showing here how this algorithms were adapted to solve the different problems of exploration exploitation.

The bandits with knapsack (BwK) framework models online decision-making problems in which an agent makes a sequence of decisions subject to resource consumption constraints. The traditional model assumes that each action consumes a non-negative amount of resources and the process ends when the initial budgets are fully depleted. We study a natural generalization of the BwK framework which allows non-monotonic resource utilization, i.e., resources can be replenished by a positive amount. We propose a best-of-both-worlds primal-dual template that can handle any online learning problem with replenishment for which a suitable primal regret minimizer exists. In particular, we provide the first positive results for the case of adversarial inputs by showing that our framework guarantees a constant competitive ratio alpha when B=Omega(T) or when the possible per-round replenishment is a positive constant. Moreover, under a stochastic input model, our algorithm yields an instance-independent O(T^{1/2}) regret bound which complements existing instance-dependent bounds for the same setting. Finally, we provide applications of our framework to some economic problems of practical relevance.

Ensuring sufficient exploration is a central challenge when training meta-reinforcement learning (meta-RL) agents to solve novel environments. Conventional solutions to the exploration-exploitation dilemma inject explicit incentives such as randomization, uncertainty bonuses, or intrinsic rewards to encourage exploration. In this work, we hypothesize that an agent trained solely to maximize a greedy (exploitation-only) objective can nonetheless exhibit emergent exploratory behavior, provided three conditions are met: (1) Recurring Environmental Structure, where the environment features repeatable regularities that allow past experience to inform future choices; (2) Agent Memory, enabling the agent to retain and utilize historical interaction data; and (3) Long-Horizon Credit Assignment, where learning propagates returns over a time frame sufficient for the delayed benefits of exploration to inform current decisions. Through experiments in stochastic multi-armed bandits and temporally extended gridworlds, we observe that, when both structure and memory are present, a policy trained on a strictly greedy objective exhibits information-seeking exploratory behavior. We further demonstrate, through controlled ablations, that emergent exploration vanishes if either environmental structure or agent memory is absent (Conditions 1 & 2). Surprisingly, removing long-horizon credit assignment (Condition 3) does not always prevent emergent exploration-a result we attribute to the pseudo-Thompson Sampling effect. These findings suggest that, under the right prerequisites, exploration and exploitation need not be treated as orthogonal objectives but can emerge from a unified reward-maximization process.

Recent research suggests that tree search algorithms (e.g. Monte Carlo Tree Search) can dramatically boost LLM performance on complex mathematical reasoning tasks. However, they often require more than 10 times the computational resources of greedy decoding due to wasteful search strategies, making them difficult to be deployed in practical applications. This study introduces a novel guided tree search algorithm with dynamic node selection and node-level exploration budget (maximum number of children) calculation to tackle this issue. By considering the search progress towards the final answer (history) and the guidance from a value network (future) trained without any step-wise annotations, our algorithm iteratively selects the most promising tree node before expanding it within the boundaries of the allocated computational budget. Experiments conducted on the GSM8K and TabMWP datasets demonstrate that our approach not only offers competitive performance but also enjoys significantly lower computational costs compared to baseline methods.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

Meta-learning empowers artificial intelligence to increase its efficiency by learning how to learn. Unlocking this potential involves overcoming a challenging meta-optimisation problem. We propose an algorithm that tackles this problem by letting the meta-learner teach itself. The algorithm first bootstraps a target from the meta-learner, then optimises the meta-learner by minimising the distance to that target under a chosen (pseudo-)metric. Focusing on meta-learning with gradients, we establish conditions that guarantee performance improvements and show that the metric can control meta-optimisation. Meanwhile, the bootstrapping mechanism can extend the effective meta-learning horizon without requiring backpropagation through all updates. We achieve a new state-of-the art for model-free agents on the Atari ALE benchmark and demonstrate that it yields both performance and efficiency gains in multi-task meta-learning. Finally, we explore how bootstrapping opens up new possibilities and find that it can meta-learn efficient exploration in an epsilon-greedy Q-learning agent, without backpropagating through the update rule.

We study the problem of optimally projecting the transition matrix of a finite ergodic multivariate Markov chain onto a lower-dimensional state space. Specifically, we seek to construct a projected Markov chain that optimizes various information-theoretic criteria under cardinality constraints. These criteria include entropy rate, information-theoretic distance to factorizability, independence, and stationarity. We formulate these tasks as best subset selection problems over multivariate Markov chains and leverage the submodular (or supermodular) structure of the objective functions to develop efficient greedy-based algorithms with theoretical guarantees. We extend our analysis to k-submodular settings and introduce a generalized version of the distorted greedy algorithm, which may be of independent interest. Finally, we illustrate the theory and algorithms through extensive numerical experiments with publicly available code on multivariate Markov chains associated with the Bernoulli-Laplace and Curie-Weiss model.

We propose a class of greedy algorithms for weighted sparse recovery by considering new loss function-based generalizations of Orthogonal Matching Pursuit (OMP). Given a (regularized) loss function, the proposed algorithms alternate the iterative construction of the signal support via greedy index selection and a signal update based on solving a local data-fitting problem restricted to the current support. We show that greedy selection rules associated with popular weighted sparsity-promoting loss functions admit explicitly computable and simple formulas. Specifically, we consider ell^0 - and ell^1 -based versions of the weighted LASSO (Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator), the Square-Root LASSO (SR-LASSO) and the Least Absolute Deviations LASSO (LAD-LASSO). Through numerical experiments on Gaussian compressive sensing and high-dimensional function approximation, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms and empirically show that they inherit desirable characteristics from the corresponding loss functions, such as SR-LASSO's noise-blind optimal parameter tuning and LAD-LASSO's fault tolerance. In doing so, our study sheds new light on the connection between greedy sparse recovery and convex relaxation.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

We compare the (1,lambda)-EA and the (1 + lambda)-EA on the recently introduced benchmark DisOM, which is the OneMax function with randomly planted local optima. Previous work showed that if all local optima have the same relative height, then the plus strategy never loses more than a factor O(nlog n) compared to the comma strategy. Here we show that even small random fluctuations in the heights of the local optima have a devastating effect for the plus strategy and lead to super-polynomial runtimes. On the other hand, due to their ability to escape local optima, comma strategies are unaffected by the height of the local optima and remain efficient. Our results hold for a broad class of possible distortions and show that the plus strategy, but not the comma strategy, is generally deceived by sparse unstructured fluctuations of a smooth landscape.

Ensembles of independently trained neural networks are a state-of-the-art approach to estimate predictive uncertainty in Deep Learning, and can be interpreted as an approximation of the posterior distribution via a mixture of delta functions. The training of ensembles relies on non-convexity of the loss landscape and random initialization of their individual members, making the resulting posterior approximation uncontrolled. This paper proposes a novel and principled method to tackle this limitation, minimizing an f-divergence between the true posterior and a kernel density estimator (KDE) in a function space. We analyze this objective from a combinatorial point of view, and show that it is submodular with respect to mixture components for any f. Subsequently, we consider the problem of greedy ensemble construction. From the marginal gain on the negative f-divergence, which quantifies an improvement in posterior approximation yielded by adding a new component into the KDE, we derive a novel diversity term for ensemble methods. The performance of our approach is demonstrated on computer vision out-of-distribution detection benchmarks in a range of architectures trained on multiple datasets. The source code of our method is made publicly available at https://github.com/Oulu-IMEDS/greedy_ensembles_training.

We present a Spades bidding algorithm that is superior to recreational human players and to publicly available bots. Like in Bridge, the game of Spades is composed of two independent phases, bidding and playing. This paper focuses on the bidding algorithm, since this phase holds a precise challenge: based on the input, choose the bid that maximizes the agent's winning probability. Our Bidding-in-Spades (BIS) algorithm heuristically determines the bidding strategy by comparing the expected utility of each possible bid. A major challenge is how to estimate these expected utilities. To this end, we propose a set of domain-specific heuristics, and then correct them via machine learning using data from real-world players. The \BIS algorithm we present can be attached to any playing algorithm. It beats rule-based bidding bots when all use the same playing component. When combined with a rule-based playing algorithm, it is superior to the average recreational human.

Motivated by concerns about making online decisions that incur undue amount of risk at each time step, in this paper, we formulate the probably anytime-safe stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits problem. In this problem, the agent is given the option to select a subset of size at most K from a set of L ground items. Each item is associated to a certain mean reward as well as a variance that represents its risk. To mitigate the risk that the agent incurs, we require that with probability at least 1-delta, over the entire horizon of time T, each of the choices that the agent makes should contain items whose sum of variances does not exceed a certain variance budget. We call this probably anytime-safe constraint. Under this constraint, we design and analyze an algorithm {\sc PASCombUCB} that minimizes the regret over the horizon of time T. By developing accompanying information-theoretic lower bounds, we show that under both the problem-dependent and problem-independent paradigms, {\sc PASCombUCB} is almost asymptotically optimal. Experiments are conducted to corroborate our theoretical findings. Our problem setup, the proposed {\sc PASCombUCB} algorithm, and novel analyses are applicable to domains such as recommendation systems and transportation in which an agent is allowed to choose multiple items at a single time step and wishes to control the risk over the whole time horizon.

This paper proposes a novel reinforcement learning (RL) framework for credit underwriting that tackles ungeneralizable contextual challenges. We adapt RL principles for credit scoring, incorporating action space renewal and multi-choice actions. Our work demonstrates that the traditional underwriting approach aligns with the RL greedy strategy. We introduce two new RL-based credit underwriting algorithms to enable more informed decision-making. Simulations show these new approaches outperform the traditional method in scenarios where the data aligns with the model. However, complex situations highlight model limitations, emphasizing the importance of powerful machine learning models for optimal performance. Future research directions include exploring more sophisticated models alongside efficient exploration mechanisms.

Evolutionary Reinforcement Learning (ERL), which integrates Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) for optimization, has demonstrated remarkable performance advancements. By fusing both approaches, ERL has emerged as a promising research direction. This survey offers a comprehensive overview of the diverse research branches in ERL. Specifically, we systematically summarize recent advancements in related algorithms and identify three primary research directions: EA-assisted Optimization of RL, RL-assisted Optimization of EA, and synergistic optimization of EA and RL. Following that, we conduct an in-depth analysis of each research direction, organizing multiple research branches. We elucidate the problems that each branch aims to tackle and how the integration of EAs and RL addresses these challenges. In conclusion, we discuss potential challenges and prospective future research directions across various research directions. To facilitate researchers in delving into ERL, we organize the algorithms and codes involved on https://github.com/yeshenpy/Awesome-Evolutionary-Reinforcement-Learning.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current game state. We study how to learn epsilon-optimal strategies in a zero-sum IIG through self-play with trajectory feedback. We give a problem-independent lower bound mathcal{O}(H(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) on the required number of realizations to learn these strategies with high probability, where H is the length of the game, A_{X} and B_{Y} are the total number of actions for the two players. We also propose two Follow the Regularized leader (FTRL) algorithms for this setting: Balanced FTRL which matches this lower bound, but requires the knowledge of the information set structure beforehand to define the regularization; and Adaptive FTRL which needs mathcal{O}(H^2(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) realizations without this requirement by progressively adapting the regularization to the observations.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

Recently, the study of linear misspecified bandits has generated intriguing implications of the hardness of learning in bandits and reinforcement learning (RL). In particular, Du et al. (2020) show that even if a learner is given linear features in R^d that approximate the rewards in a bandit or RL with a uniform error of varepsilon, searching for an O(varepsilon)-optimal action requires pulling at least Omega(exp(d)) queries. Furthermore, Lattimore et al. (2020) show that a degraded O(varepsilond)-optimal solution can be learned within poly(d/varepsilon) queries. Yet it is unknown whether a structural assumption on the ground-truth parameter, such as sparsity, could break the varepsilond barrier. In this paper, we address this question by showing that algorithms can obtain O(varepsilon)-optimal actions by querying O(varepsilon^{-s}d^s) actions, where s is the sparsity parameter, removing the exp(d)-dependence. We then establish information-theoretical lower bounds, i.e., Omega(exp(s)), to show that our upper bound on sample complexity is nearly tight if one demands an error O(s^{delta}varepsilon) for 0<delta<1. For deltageq 1, we further show that poly(s/varepsilon) queries are possible when the linear features are "good" and even in general settings. These results provide a nearly complete picture of how sparsity can help in misspecified bandit learning and provide a deeper understanding of when linear features are "useful" for bandit and reinforcement learning with misspecification.

Byte-Pair Encoding (BPE) is a popular algorithm used for tokenizing data in NLP, despite being devised initially as a compression method. BPE appears to be a greedy algorithm at face value, but the underlying optimization problem that BPE seeks to solve has not yet been laid down. We formalize BPE as a combinatorial optimization problem. Via submodular functions, we prove that the iterative greedy version is a 1{{sigma(mu^star)}}(1-e^{-{sigma(mu^star)}})-approximation of an optimal merge sequence, where {sigma(mu^star)} is the total backward curvature with respect to the optimal merge sequence mu^star. Empirically the lower bound of the approximation is approx 0.37. We provide a faster implementation of BPE which improves the runtime complexity from Oleft(N Mright) to Oleft(N log Mright), where N is the sequence length and M is the merge count. Finally, we optimize the brute-force algorithm for optimal BPE using memoization.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

To develop a trustworthy AI system, which aim to identify the input regions that most influence the models decisions. The primary task of existing attribution methods lies in efficiently and accurately identifying the relationships among input-prediction interactions. Particularly when the input data is discrete, such as images, analyzing the relationship between inputs and outputs poses a significant challenge due to the combinatorial explosion. In this paper, we propose a novel and efficient black-box attribution mechanism, LiMA (Less input is More faithful for Attribution), which reformulates the attribution of important regions as an optimization problem for submodular subset selection. First, to accurately assess interactions, we design a submodular function that quantifies subset importance and effectively captures their impact on decision outcomes. Then, efficiently ranking input sub-regions by their importance for attribution, we improve optimization efficiency through a novel bidirectional greedy search algorithm. LiMA identifies both the most and least important samples while ensuring an optimal attribution boundary that minimizes errors. Extensive experiments on eight foundation models demonstrate that our method provides faithful interpretations with fewer regions and exhibits strong generalization, shows an average improvement of 36.3% in Insertion and 39.6% in Deletion. Our method also outperforms the naive greedy search in attribution efficiency, being 1.6 times faster. Furthermore, when explaining the reasons behind model prediction errors, the average highest confidence achieved by our method is, on average, 86.1% higher than that of state-of-the-art attribution algorithms. The code is available at https://github.com/RuoyuChen10/LIMA.

Inference-time optimization scales computation to derive deliberate reasoning steps for effective performance. While previous search-based strategies address the short-sightedness of auto-regressive generation, the vast search space leads to excessive exploration and insufficient exploitation. To strike an efficient balance to derive the optimal step, we frame the decoding strategy as foresight sampling, leveraging simulated future steps to obtain globally optimal step estimation. Built on it, we propose a novel decoding strategy, named phi-Decoding. To provide a precise and expressive estimation of step value, phi-Decoding approximates two distributions via foresight and clustering. Sampling from the joint distribution, the optimal steps can be selected for exploitation. To support adaptive computation allocation, we propose in-width and in-depth pruning strategies, featuring a light-weight solution to achieve inference efficiency. Extensive experiments across seven benchmarks show phi-Decoding outperforms strong baselines in both performance and efficiency. Additional analysis demonstrates its generalization across various LLMs and scalability across a wide range of computing budgets. The code will be released at https://github.com/xufangzhi/phi-Decoding, and the open-source PyPI package is coming soon.

We consider the problem of ranking n experts based on their performances on d tasks. We make a monotonicity assumption stating that for each pair of experts, one outperforms the other on all tasks. We consider the sequential setting where in each round, the learner has access to noisy evaluations of actively chosen pair of expert-task, given the information available up to the actual round. Given a confidence parameter delta in (0, 1), we provide strategies allowing to recover the correct ranking of experts and develop a bound on the total number of queries made by our algorithm that hold with probability at least 1 -- delta. We show that our strategy is adaptive to the complexity of the problem (our bounds are instance dependent), and develop matching lower bounds up to a poly-logarithmic factor. Finally, we adapt our strategy to the relaxed problem of best expert identification and provide numerical simulation consistent with our theoretical results.

In this paper, we consider the problem of Iterative Machine Teaching (IMT), where the teacher provides examples to the learner iteratively such that the learner can achieve fast convergence to a target model. However, existing IMT algorithms are solely based on parameterized families of target models. They mainly focus on convergence in the parameter space, resulting in difficulty when the target models are defined to be functions without dependency on parameters. To address such a limitation, we study a more general task -- Nonparametric Iterative Machine Teaching (NIMT), which aims to teach nonparametric target models to learners in an iterative fashion. Unlike parametric IMT that merely operates in the parameter space, we cast NIMT as a functional optimization problem in the function space. To solve it, we propose both random and greedy functional teaching algorithms. We obtain the iterative teaching dimension (ITD) of the random teaching algorithm under proper assumptions, which serves as a uniform upper bound of ITD in NIMT. Further, the greedy teaching algorithm has a significantly lower ITD, which reaches a tighter upper bound of ITD in NIMT. Finally, we verify the correctness of our theoretical findings with extensive experiments in nonparametric scenarios.

We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal announces a scoring rule that specifies the payment, and then the agent then chooses an effort level that maximizes her own profit and reports the information. We study the online setting of such a problem from the principal's perspective, i.e., designing the optimal scoring rule by repeatedly interacting with the strategic agent. We design a provably sample efficient algorithm that tailors the UCB algorithm (Auer et al., 2002) to our model, which achieves a sublinear T^{2/3}-regret after T iterations. Our algorithm features a delicate estimation procedure for the optimal profit of the principal, and a conservative correction scheme that ensures the desired agent's actions are incentivized. Furthermore, a key feature of our regret bound is that it is independent of the number of states of the environment.

A significant use case of instruction-finetuned Large Language Models (LLMs) is to solve question-answering tasks interactively. In this setting, an LLM agent is tasked with making a prediction by sequentially querying relevant information from the user, as opposed to a single-turn conversation. This paper explores sequential querying strategies that aim to minimize the expected number of queries. One such strategy is Information Pursuit (IP), a greedy algorithm that at each iteration selects the query that maximizes information gain or equivalently minimizes uncertainty. However, obtaining accurate estimates of mutual information or conditional entropy for LLMs is very difficult in practice due to over- or under-confident LLM probabilities, which leads to suboptimal query selection and predictive performance. To better estimate the uncertainty at each iteration, we propose Conformal Information Pursuit (C-IP), an alternative approach to sequential information gain based on conformal prediction sets. More specifically, C-IP leverages a relationship between prediction sets and conditional entropy at each iteration to estimate uncertainty based on the average size of conformal prediction sets. In contrast to conditional entropy, we find that conformal prediction sets are a distribution-free and robust method of measuring uncertainty. Experiments with 20 Questions show that C-IP obtains better predictive performance and shorter query-answer chains compared to previous approaches to IP and uncertainty-based chain-of-thought methods. Furthermore, extending to an interactive medical setting between a doctor and a patient on the MediQ dataset, C-IP achieves competitive performance with direct single-turn prediction while offering greater interpretability.

We study linear contextual bandits in the misspecified setting, where the expected reward function can be approximated by a linear function class up to a bounded misspecification level zeta>0. We propose an algorithm based on a novel data selection scheme, which only selects the contextual vectors with large uncertainty for online regression. We show that, when the misspecification level zeta is dominated by tilde O (Delta / d) with Delta being the minimal sub-optimality gap and d being the dimension of the contextual vectors, our algorithm enjoys the same gap-dependent regret bound tilde O (d^2/Delta) as in the well-specified setting up to logarithmic factors. In addition, we show that an existing algorithm SupLinUCB (Chu et al., 2011) can also achieve a gap-dependent constant regret bound without the knowledge of sub-optimality gap Delta. Together with a lower bound adapted from Lattimore et al. (2020), our result suggests an interplay between misspecification level and the sub-optimality gap: (1) the linear contextual bandit model is efficiently learnable when zeta leq tilde O(Delta / d); and (2) it is not efficiently learnable when zeta geq tilde Omega({Delta} / {d}). Experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets corroborate our theoretical results.

Selecting high-quality and diverse training samples from extensive datasets plays a crucial role in reducing training overhead and enhancing the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, existing studies fall short in assessing the overall value of selected data, focusing primarily on individual quality, and struggle to strike an effective balance between ensuring diversity and minimizing data point traversals. Therefore, this paper introduces a novel choice-based sample selection framework that shifts the focus from evaluating individual sample quality to comparing the contribution value of different samples when incorporated into the subset. Thanks to the advanced language understanding capabilities of LLMs, we utilize LLMs to evaluate the value of each option during the selection process. Furthermore, we design a greedy sampling process where samples are incrementally added to the subset, thereby improving efficiency by eliminating the need for exhaustive traversal of the entire dataset with the limited budget. Extensive experiments demonstrate that selected data from our method not only surpass the performance of the full dataset but also achieves competitive results with state-of-the-art (SOTA) studies, while requiring fewer selections. Moreover, we validate our approach on a larger medical dataset, highlighting its practical applicability in real-world applications.

We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX_0, EFX^3 and EF1^3 - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1^3 allocation. With -alpha/0/alpha utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX^3 and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With -alpha/0/beta utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.

Most learning algorithms with formal regret guarantees assume that no mistake is irreparable and essentially rely on trying all possible behaviors. This approach is problematic when some mistakes are catastrophic, i.e., irreparable. We propose an online learning problem where the goal is to minimize the chance of catastrophe. Specifically, we assume that the payoff in each round represents the chance of avoiding catastrophe that round and aim to maximize the product of payoffs (the overall chance of avoiding catastrophe) while allowing a limited number of queries to a mentor. We first show that in general, any algorithm either constantly queries the mentor or is nearly guaranteed to cause catastrophe. However, in settings where the mentor policy class is learnable in the standard online learning model, we provide an algorithm whose regret and rate of querying the mentor both approach 0 as the time horizon grows. Conceptually, if a policy class is learnable in the absence of catastrophic risk, it is learnable in the presence of catastrophic risk if the agent can ask for help.

In Reinforcement Learning (RL), an agent acts in an unknown environment to maximize the expected cumulative discounted sum of an external reward signal, i.e., the expected return. In practice, in many tasks of interest, such as policy optimization, the agent usually spends its interaction budget by collecting episodes of fixed length within a simulator (i.e., Monte Carlo simulation). However, given the discounted nature of the RL objective, this data collection strategy might not be the best option. Indeed, the rewards taken in early simulation steps weigh exponentially more than future rewards. Taking a cue from this intuition, in this paper, we design an a-priori budget allocation strategy that leads to the collection of trajectories of different lengths, i.e., truncated. The proposed approach provably minimizes the width of the confidence intervals around the empirical estimates of the expected return of a policy. After discussing the theoretical properties of our method, we make use of our trajectory truncation mechanism to extend Policy Optimization via Importance Sampling (POIS, Metelli et al., 2018) algorithm. Finally, we conduct a numerical comparison between our algorithm and POIS: the results are consistent with our theory and show that an appropriate truncation of the trajectories can succeed in improving performance.

Multi-armed bandits a simple but very powerful framework for algorithms that make decisions over time under uncertainty. An enormous body of work has accumulated over the years, covered in several books and surveys. This book provides a more introductory, textbook-like treatment of the subject. Each chapter tackles a particular line of work, providing a self-contained, teachable technical introduction and a brief review of the further developments; many of the chapters conclude with exercises. The book is structured as follows. The first four chapters are on IID rewards, from the basic model to impossibility results to Bayesian priors to Lipschitz rewards. The next three chapters cover adversarial rewards, from the full-feedback version to adversarial bandits to extensions with linear rewards and combinatorially structured actions. Chapter 8 is on contextual bandits, a middle ground between IID and adversarial bandits in which the change in reward distributions is completely explained by observable contexts. The last three chapters cover connections to economics, from learning in repeated games to bandits with supply/budget constraints to exploration in the presence of incentives. The appendix provides sufficient background on concentration and KL-divergence. The chapters on "bandits with similarity information", "bandits with knapsacks" and "bandits and agents" can also be consumed as standalone surveys on the respective topics.

Test-time compute scaling has emerged as a new axis along which to improve model accuracy, where additional computation is used at inference time to allow the model to think longer for more challenging problems. One promising approach for test-time compute scaling is search against a process reward model, where a model generates multiple potential candidates at each step of the search, and these partial trajectories are then scored by a separate reward model in order to guide the search process. The diversity of trajectories in the tree search process affects the accuracy of the search, since increasing diversity promotes more exploration. However, this diversity comes at a cost, as divergent trajectories have less KV sharing, which means they consume more memory and slow down the search process. Previous search methods either do not perform sufficient exploration, or else explore diverse trajectories but have high latency. We address this challenge by proposing Efficient Tree Search (ETS), which promotes KV sharing by pruning redundant trajectories while maintaining necessary diverse trajectories. ETS incorporates a linear programming cost model to promote KV cache sharing by penalizing the number of nodes retained, while incorporating a semantic coverage term into the cost model to ensure that we retain trajectories which are semantically different. We demonstrate how ETS can achieve 1.8times reduction in average KV cache size during the search process, leading to 1.4times increased throughput relative to prior state-of-the-art methods, with minimal accuracy degradation and without requiring any custom kernel implementation. Code is available at: https://github.com/SqueezeAILab/ETS.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

Fine-tuned language models use greedy decoding to answer reading comprehension questions with relative success. However, this approach does not ensure that the answer is a span in the given passage, nor does it guarantee that it is the most probable one. Does greedy decoding actually perform worse than an algorithm that does adhere to these properties? To study the performance and optimality of greedy decoding, we present exact-extract, a decoding algorithm that efficiently finds the most probable answer span in the context. We compare the performance of T5 with both decoding algorithms on zero-shot and few-shot extractive question answering. When no training examples are available, exact-extract significantly outperforms greedy decoding. However, greedy decoding quickly converges towards the performance of exact-extract with the introduction of a few training examples, becoming more extractive and increasingly likelier to generate the most probable span as the training set grows. We also show that self-supervised training can bias the model towards extractive behavior, increasing performance in the zero-shot setting without resorting to annotated examples. Overall, our results suggest that pretrained language models are so good at adapting to extractive question answering, that it is often enough to fine-tune on a small training set for the greedy algorithm to emulate the optimal decoding strategy.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

This paper investigates the problem of generalized linear bandits with heavy-tailed rewards, whose (1+epsilon)-th moment is bounded for some epsilonin (0,1]. Although there exist methods for generalized linear bandits, most of them focus on bounded or sub-Gaussian rewards and are not well-suited for many real-world scenarios, such as financial markets and web-advertising. To address this issue, we propose two novel algorithms based on truncation and mean of medians. These algorithms achieve an almost optimal regret bound of O(dT^{1{1+epsilon}}), where d is the dimension of contextual information and T is the time horizon. Our truncation-based algorithm supports online learning, distinguishing it from existing truncation-based approaches. Additionally, our mean-of-medians-based algorithm requires only O(log T) rewards and one estimator per epoch, making it more practical. Moreover, our algorithms improve the regret bounds by a logarithmic factor compared to existing algorithms when epsilon=1. Numerical experimental results confirm the merits of our algorithms.

Finding the optimal Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) configuration for a given use case can be complex and expensive. Motivated by this challenge, frameworks for RAG hyper-parameter optimization (HPO) have recently emerged, yet their effectiveness has not been rigorously benchmarked. To address this gap, we present a comprehensive study involving 5 HPO algorithms over 5 datasets from diverse domains, including a new one collected for this work on real-world product documentation. Our study explores the largest HPO search space considered to date, with two optimized evaluation metrics. Analysis of the results shows that RAG HPO can be done efficiently, either greedily or with iterative random search, and that it significantly boosts RAG performance for all datasets. For greedy HPO approaches, we show that optimizing models first is preferable to the prevalent practice of optimizing sequentially according to the RAG pipeline order.

We advance the study of incentivized bandit exploration, in which arm choices are viewed as recommendations and are required to be Bayesian incentive compatible. Recent work has shown under certain independence assumptions that after collecting enough initial samples, the popular Thompson sampling algorithm becomes incentive compatible. We give an analog of this result for linear bandits, where the independence of the prior is replaced by a natural convexity condition. This opens up the possibility of efficient and regret-optimal incentivized exploration in high-dimensional action spaces. In the semibandit model, we also improve the sample complexity for the pre-Thompson sampling phase of initial data collection.

Solving a linear system Ax=b is a fundamental scientific computing primitive for which numerous solvers and preconditioners have been developed. These come with parameters whose optimal values depend on the system being solved and are often impossible or too expensive to identify; thus in practice sub-optimal heuristics are used. We consider the common setting in which many related linear systems need to be solved, e.g. during a single numerical simulation. In this scenario, can we sequentially choose parameters that attain a near-optimal overall number of iterations, without extra matrix computations? We answer in the affirmative for Successive Over-Relaxation (SOR), a standard solver whose parameter omega has a strong impact on its runtime. For this method, we prove that a bandit online learning algorithm--using only the number of iterations as feedback--can select parameters for a sequence of instances such that the overall cost approaches that of the best fixed omega as the sequence length increases. Furthermore, when given additional structural information, we show that a contextual bandit method asymptotically achieves the performance of the instance-optimal policy, which selects the best omega for each instance. Our work provides the first learning-theoretic treatment of high-precision linear system solvers and the first end-to-end guarantees for data-driven scientific computing, demonstrating theoretically the potential to speed up numerical methods using well-understood learning algorithms.

In this paper, we introduce the Preselection Bandit problem, in which the learner preselects a subset of arms (choice alternatives) for a user, which then chooses the final arm from this subset. The learner is not aware of the user's preferences, but can learn them from observed choices. In our concrete setting, we allow these choices to be stochastic and model the user's actions by means of the Plackett-Luce model. The learner's main task is to preselect subsets that eventually lead to highly preferred choices. To formalize this goal, we introduce a reasonable notion of regret and derive lower bounds on the expected regret. Moreover, we propose algorithms for which the upper bound on expected regret matches the lower bound up to a logarithmic term of the time horizon.

The success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sparked interest in various agentic applications. A key hypothesis is that LLMs, leveraging common sense and Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning, can effectively explore and efficiently solve complex domains. However, LLM agents have been found to suffer from sub-optimal exploration and the knowing-doing gap, the inability to effectively act on knowledge present in the model. In this work, we systematically study why LLMs perform sub-optimally in decision-making scenarios. In particular, we closely examine three prevalent failure modes: greediness, frequency bias, and the knowing-doing gap. We propose mitigation of these shortcomings by fine-tuning via Reinforcement Learning (RL) on self-generated CoT rationales. Our experiments across multi-armed bandits, contextual bandits, and Tic-tac-toe, demonstrate that RL fine-tuning enhances the decision-making abilities of LLMs by increasing exploration and narrowing the knowing-doing gap. Finally, we study both classic exploration mechanisms, such as epsilon-greedy, and LLM-specific approaches, such as self-correction and self-consistency, to enable more effective fine-tuning of LLMs for decision-making.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

We consider the combinatorial bandits problem with semi-bandit feedback under finite sampling budget constraints, in which the learner can carry out its action only for a limited number of times specified by an overall budget. The action is to choose a set of arms, whereupon feedback for each arm in the chosen set is received. Unlike existing works, we study this problem in a non-stochastic setting with subset-dependent feedback, i.e., the semi-bandit feedback received could be generated by an oblivious adversary and also might depend on the chosen set of arms. In addition, we consider a general feedback scenario covering both the numerical-based as well as preference-based case and introduce a sound theoretical framework for this setting guaranteeing sensible notions of optimal arms, which a learner seeks to find. We suggest a generic algorithm suitable to cover the full spectrum of conceivable arm elimination strategies from aggressive to conservative. Theoretical questions about the sufficient and necessary budget of the algorithm to find the best arm are answered and complemented by deriving lower bounds for any learning algorithm for this problem scenario.

This paper addresses the difficult problem of finding an optimal neural architecture design for a given image classification task. We propose a method that aggregates two main results of the previous state-of-the-art in neural architecture search. These are, appealing to the strong sampling efficiency of a search scheme based on sequential model-based optimization (SMBO), and increasing training efficiency by sharing weights among sampled architectures. Sequential search has previously demonstrated its capabilities to find state-of-the-art neural architectures for image classification. However, its computational cost remains high, even unreachable under modest computational settings. Affording SMBO with weight-sharing alleviates this problem. On the other hand, progressive search with SMBO is inherently greedy, as it leverages a learned surrogate function to predict the validation error of neural architectures. This prediction is directly used to rank the sampled neural architectures. We propose to attenuate the greediness of the original SMBO method by relaxing the role of the surrogate function so it predicts architecture sampling probability instead. We demonstrate with experiments on the CIFAR-10 dataset that our method, denominated Efficient progressive neural architecture search (EPNAS), leads to increased search efficiency, while retaining competitiveness of found architectures.

We consider an online learning problem with one-sided feedback, in which the learner is able to observe the true label only for positively predicted instances. On each round, k instances arrive and receive classification outcomes according to a randomized policy deployed by the learner, whose goal is to maximize accuracy while deploying individually fair policies. We first extend the framework of Bechavod et al. (2020), which relies on the existence of a human fairness auditor for detecting fairness violations, to instead incorporate feedback from dynamically-selected panels of multiple, possibly inconsistent, auditors. We then construct an efficient reduction from our problem of online learning with one-sided feedback and a panel reporting fairness violations to the contextual combinatorial semi-bandit problem (Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi, 2009, Gy\"{o}rgy et al., 2007). Finally, we show how to leverage the guarantees of two algorithms in the contextual combinatorial semi-bandit setting: Exp2 (Bubeck et al., 2012) and the oracle-efficient Context-Semi-Bandit-FTPL (Syrgkanis et al., 2016), to provide multi-criteria no regret guarantees simultaneously for accuracy and fairness. Our results eliminate two potential sources of bias from prior work: the "hidden outcomes" that are not available to an algorithm operating in the full information setting, and human biases that might be present in any single human auditor, but can be mitigated by selecting a well chosen panel.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

We consider multi-draft speculative sampling, where the proposal sequences are sampled independently from different draft models. At each step, a token-level draft selection scheme takes a list of valid tokens as input and produces an output token whose distribution matches that of the target model. Previous works have demonstrated that the optimal scheme (which maximizes the probability of accepting one of the input tokens) can be cast as a solution to a linear program. In this work we show that the optimal scheme can be decomposed into a two-step solution: in the first step an importance sampling (IS) type scheme is used to select one intermediate token; in the second step (single-draft) speculative sampling is applied to generate the output token. For the case of two identical draft models we further 1) establish a necessary and sufficient condition on the distributions of the target and draft models for the acceptance probability to equal one and 2) provide an explicit expression for the optimal acceptance probability. Our theoretical analysis also motives a new class of token-level selection scheme based on weighted importance sampling. Our experimental results demonstrate consistent improvements in the achievable block efficiency and token rates over baseline schemes in a number of scenarios.

We present new algorithms for optimizing non-smooth, non-convex stochastic objectives based on a novel analysis technique. This improves the current best-known complexity for finding a (delta,epsilon)-stationary point from O(epsilon^{-4}delta^{-1}) stochastic gradient queries to O(epsilon^{-3}delta^{-1}), which we also show to be optimal. Our primary technique is a reduction from non-smooth non-convex optimization to online learning, after which our results follow from standard regret bounds in online learning. For deterministic and second-order smooth objectives, applying more advanced optimistic online learning techniques enables a new complexity of O(epsilon^{-1.5}delta^{-0.5}). Our techniques also recover all optimal or best-known results for finding epsilon stationary points of smooth or second-order smooth objectives in both stochastic and deterministic settings.

We explore algorithms to select actions in the causal bandit setting where the learner can choose to intervene on a set of random variables related by a causal graph, and the learner sequentially chooses interventions and observes a sample from the interventional distribution. The learner's goal is to quickly find the intervention, among all interventions on observable variables, that maximizes the expectation of an outcome variable. We depart from previous literature by assuming no knowledge of the causal graph except that latent confounders between the outcome and its ancestors are not present. We first show that the unknown graph problem can be exponentially hard in the parents of the outcome. To remedy this, we adopt an additional additive assumption on the outcome which allows us to solve the problem by casting it as an additive combinatorial linear bandit problem with full-bandit feedback. We propose a novel action-elimination algorithm for this setting, show how to apply this algorithm to the causal bandit problem, provide sample complexity bounds, and empirically validate our findings on a suite of randomly generated causal models, effectively showing that one does not need to explicitly learn the parents of the outcome to identify the best intervention.

Implementing a reward function that perfectly captures a complex task in the real world is impractical. As a result, it is often appropriate to think of the reward function as a proxy for the true objective rather than as its definition. We study this phenomenon through the lens of Goodhart's law, which predicts that increasing optimisation of an imperfect proxy beyond some critical point decreases performance on the true objective. First, we propose a way to quantify the magnitude of this effect and show empirically that optimising an imperfect proxy reward often leads to the behaviour predicted by Goodhart's law for a wide range of environments and reward functions. We then provide a geometric explanation for why Goodhart's law occurs in Markov decision processes. We use these theoretical insights to propose an optimal early stopping method that provably avoids the aforementioned pitfall and derive theoretical regret bounds for this method. Moreover, we derive a training method that maximises worst-case reward, for the setting where there is uncertainty about the true reward function. Finally, we evaluate our early stopping method experimentally. Our results support a foundation for a theoretically-principled study of reinforcement learning under reward misspecification.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

We study the non-stationary dueling bandits problem with K arms, where the time horizon T consists of M stationary segments, each of which is associated with its own preference matrix. The learner repeatedly selects a pair of arms and observes a binary preference between them as feedback. To minimize the accumulated regret, the learner needs to pick the Condorcet winner of each stationary segment as often as possible, despite preference matrices and segment lengths being unknown. We propose the Beat, the, Winner, Reset algorithm and prove a bound on its expected binary weak regret in the stationary case, which tightens the bound of current state-of-art algorithms. We also show a regret bound for the non-stationary case, without requiring knowledge of M or T. We further propose and analyze two meta-algorithms, DETECT for weak regret and Monitored, Dueling, Bandits for strong regret, both based on a detection-window approach that can incorporate any dueling bandit algorithm as a black-box algorithm. Finally, we prove a worst-case lower bound for expected weak regret in the non-stationary case.

Risk-averse reinforcement learning finds application in various high-stakes fields. Unlike classical reinforcement learning, which aims to maximize expected returns, risk-averse agents choose policies that minimize risk, occasionally sacrificing expected value. These preferences can be framed through utility theory. We focus on the specific case of the exponential utility function, where we can derive the Bellman equations and employ various reinforcement learning algorithms with few modifications. However, these methods suffer from numerical instability due to the need for exponent computation throughout the process. To address this, we introduce a numerically stable and mathematically sound loss function based on the Itakura-Saito divergence for learning state-value and action-value functions. We evaluate our proposed loss function against established alternatives, both theoretically and empirically. In the experimental section, we explore multiple financial scenarios, some with known analytical solutions, and show that our loss function outperforms the alternatives.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

We consider non-clairvoyant scheduling with online precedence constraints, where an algorithm is oblivious to any job dependencies and learns about a job only if all of its predecessors have been completed. Given strong impossibility results in classical competitive analysis, we investigate the problem in a learning-augmented setting, where an algorithm has access to predictions without any quality guarantee. We discuss different prediction models: novel problem-specific models as well as general ones, which have been proposed in previous works. We present lower bounds and algorithmic upper bounds for different precedence topologies, and thereby give a structured overview on which and how additional (possibly erroneous) information helps for designing better algorithms. Along the way, we also improve bounds on traditional competitive ratios for existing algorithms.

In risk-averse reinforcement learning (RL), the goal is to optimize some risk measure of the returns. A risk measure often focuses on the worst returns out of the agent's experience. As a result, standard methods for risk-averse RL often ignore high-return strategies. We prove that under certain conditions this inevitably leads to a local-optimum barrier, and propose a soft risk mechanism to bypass it. We also devise a novel Cross Entropy module for risk sampling, which (1) preserves risk aversion despite the soft risk; (2) independently improves sample efficiency. By separating the risk aversion of the sampler and the optimizer, we can sample episodes with poor conditions, yet optimize with respect to successful strategies. We combine these two concepts in CeSoR - Cross-entropy Soft-Risk optimization algorithm - which can be applied on top of any risk-averse policy gradient (PG) method. We demonstrate improved risk aversion in maze navigation, autonomous driving, and resource allocation benchmarks, including in scenarios where standard risk-averse PG completely fails.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

We consider the task of identifying the Copeland winner(s) in a dueling bandits problem with ternary feedback. This is an underexplored but practically relevant variant of the conventional dueling bandits problem, in which, in addition to strict preference between two arms, one may observe feedback in the form of an indifference. We provide a lower bound on the sample complexity for any learning algorithm finding the Copeland winner(s) with a fixed error probability. Moreover, we propose POCOWISTA, an algorithm with a sample complexity that almost matches this lower bound, and which shows excellent empirical performance, even for the conventional dueling bandits problem. For the case where the preference probabilities satisfy a specific type of stochastic transitivity, we provide a refined version with an improved worst case sample complexity.

Learning optimal policies in sparse rewards settings is difficult as the learning agent has little to no feedback on the quality of its actions. In these situations, a good strategy is to focus on exploration, hopefully leading to the discovery of a reward signal to improve on. A learning algorithm capable of dealing with this kind of settings has to be able to (1) explore possible agent behaviors and (2) exploit any possible discovered reward. Efficient exploration algorithms have been proposed that require to define a behavior space, that associates to an agent its resulting behavior in a space that is known to be worth exploring. The need to define this space is a limitation of these algorithms. In this work, we introduce STAX, an algorithm designed to learn a behavior space on-the-fly and to explore it while efficiently optimizing any reward discovered. It does so by separating the exploration and learning of the behavior space from the exploitation of the reward through an alternating two-steps process. In the first step, STAX builds a repertoire of diverse policies while learning a low-dimensional representation of the high-dimensional observations generated during the policies evaluation. In the exploitation step, emitters are used to optimize the performance of the discovered rewarding solutions. Experiments conducted on three different sparse reward environments show that STAX performs comparably to existing baselines while requiring much less prior information about the task as it autonomously builds the behavior space.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

We study online reinforcement learning in linear Markov decision processes with adversarial losses and bandit feedback, without prior knowledge on transitions or access to simulators. We introduce two algorithms that achieve improved regret performance compared to existing approaches. The first algorithm, although computationally inefficient, ensures a regret of mathcal{O}left(Kright), where K is the number of episodes. This is the first result with the optimal K dependence in the considered setting. The second algorithm, which is based on the policy optimization framework, guarantees a regret of mathcal{O}left(K^{3{4}} right) and is computationally efficient. Both our results significantly improve over the state-of-the-art: a computationally inefficient algorithm by Kong et al. [2023] with mathcal{O}left(K^{4{5}}+polyleft(1{lambda_{min}}right) right) regret, for some problem-dependent constant lambda_{min} that can be arbitrarily close to zero, and a computationally efficient algorithm by Sherman et al. [2023b] with mathcal{O}left(K^{6{7}} right) regret.

The output of Large Language Models (LLMs) are a function of the internal model's parameters and the input provided into the context window. The hypothesis presented here is that under a greedy sampling strategy the variance in the LLM's output is a function of the conceptual certainty embedded in the model's parametric knowledge, as well as the lexical variance in the input. Finetuning the model results in reducing the sensitivity of the model output to the lexical input variations. This is then applied to a classification problem and a probabilistic method is proposed for estimating the certainties of the predicted classes.

We study reward-free reinforcement learning (RL) with linear function approximation, where the agent works in two phases: (1) in the exploration phase, the agent interacts with the environment but cannot access the reward; and (2) in the planning phase, the agent is given a reward function and is expected to find a near-optimal policy based on samples collected in the exploration phase. The sample complexities of existing reward-free algorithms have a polynomial dependence on the planning horizon, which makes them intractable for long planning horizon RL problems. In this paper, we propose a new reward-free algorithm for learning linear mixture Markov decision processes (MDPs), where the transition probability can be parameterized as a linear combination of known feature mappings. At the core of our algorithm is uncertainty-weighted value-targeted regression with exploration-driven pseudo-reward and a high-order moment estimator for the aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties. When the total reward is bounded by 1, we show that our algorithm only needs to explore tilde O( d^2varepsilon^{-2}) episodes to find an varepsilon-optimal policy, where d is the dimension of the feature mapping. The sample complexity of our algorithm only has a polylogarithmic dependence on the planning horizon and therefore is ``horizon-free''. In addition, we provide an Omega(d^2varepsilon^{-2}) sample complexity lower bound, which matches the sample complexity of our algorithm up to logarithmic factors, suggesting that our algorithm is optimal.

Training LLM agents in multi-turn environments with sparse rewards, where completing a single task requires 30+ turns of interaction within an episode, presents a fundamental challenge for reinforcement learning. We identify a critical failure mode unique to this setting: the exploration-exploitation cascade failure. This cascade begins with early-stage policy premature convergence, where sparse feedback causes agents to commit to flawed, low-entropy strategies. Subsequently, agents enter late-stage policy collapse, where conventional entropy regularization becomes counterproductive, promoting chaotic exploration that destabilizes training. We propose Entropy-regularized Policy Optimization (EPO), a general framework that breaks this failure cycle through three synergistic mechanisms: (1) adopting entropy regularization in multi-turn settings to enhance exploration, (2) an entropy smoothing regularizer that bounds policy entropy within historical averages to prevent abrupt fluctuations, and (3) adaptive phase-based weighting that balances exploration and exploitation across training. Our analysis justifies that EPO guarantees monotonically decreasing entropy variance while maintaining convergence. EPO achieves up to 152% performance improvement on ScienceWorld and up to 19.8% on ALFWorld. Our work demonstrates that multi-turn sparse-reward settings require fundamentally different entropy control than traditional RL, with broad implications for LLM agent training.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

The increasing complexity of advanced machine learning models requires innovative approaches to manage computational resources effectively. One such method is the Early Exit strategy, which allows for adaptive computation by providing a mechanism to shorten the processing path for simpler data instances. In this paper, we propose EERO, a new methodology to translate the problem of early exiting to a problem of using multiple classifiers with reject option in order to better select the exiting head for each instance. We calibrate the probabilities of exiting at the different heads using aggregation with exponential weights to guarantee a fixed budget .We consider factors such as Bayesian risk, budget constraints, and head-specific budget consumption. Experimental results, conducted using a ResNet-18 model and a ConvNext architecture on Cifar and ImageNet datasets, demonstrate that our method not only effectively manages budget allocation but also enhances accuracy in overthinking scenarios.

We study the design of loss functions for click-through rates (CTR) to optimize (social) welfare in advertising auctions. Existing works either only focus on CTR predictions without consideration of business objectives (e.g., welfare) in auctions or assume that the distribution over the participants' expected cost-per-impression (eCPM) is known a priori, then use various additional assumptions on the parametric form of the distribution to derive loss functions for predicting CTRs. In this work, we bring back the welfare objectives of ad auctions into CTR predictions and propose a novel weighted rankloss to train the CTR model. Compared to existing literature, our approach provides a provable guarantee on welfare but without assumptions on the eCPMs' distribution while also avoiding the intractability of naively applying existing learning-to-rank methods. Further, we propose a theoretically justifiable technique for calibrating the losses using labels generated from a teacher network, only assuming that the teacher network has bounded ell_2 generalization error. Finally, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed loss on synthetic and real-world data.

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximating Nash equilibria, resulting in novel algorithms with provable guarantees. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments demonstrating that stochastic gradient descent can outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

We consider the task of evaluating policies of algorithmic resource allocation through randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Such policies are tasked with optimizing the utilization of limited intervention resources, with the goal of maximizing the benefits derived. Evaluation of such allocation policies through RCTs proves difficult, notwithstanding the scale of the trial, because the individuals' outcomes are inextricably interlinked through resource constraints controlling the policy decisions. Our key contribution is to present a new estimator leveraging our proposed novel concept, that involves retrospective reshuffling of participants across experimental arms at the end of an RCT. We identify conditions under which such reassignments are permissible and can be leveraged to construct counterfactual trials, whose outcomes can be accurately ascertained, for free. We prove theoretically that such an estimator is more accurate than common estimators based on sample means -- we show that it returns an unbiased estimate and simultaneously reduces variance. We demonstrate the value of our approach through empirical experiments on synthetic, semi-synthetic as well as real case study data and show improved estimation accuracy across the board.

Pruning is a standard technique for reducing the computational cost of deep networks. Many advances in pruning leverage concepts from the Lottery Ticket Hypothesis (LTH). LTH reveals that inside a trained dense network exists sparse subnetworks (tickets) able to achieve similar accuracy (i.e., win the lottery - winning tickets). Pruning at initialization focuses on finding winning tickets without training a dense network. Studies on these concepts share the trend that subnetworks come from weight or filter pruning. In this work, we investigate LTH and pruning at initialization from the lens of layer pruning. First, we confirm the existence of winning tickets when the pruning process removes layers. Leveraged by this observation, we propose to discover these winning tickets at initialization, eliminating the requirement of heavy computational resources for training the initial (over-parameterized) dense network. Extensive experiments show that our winning tickets notably speed up the training phase and reduce up to 51% of carbon emission, an important step towards democratization and green Artificial Intelligence. Beyond computational benefits, our winning tickets exhibit robustness against adversarial and out-of-distribution examples. Finally, we show that our subnetworks easily win the lottery at initialization while tickets from filter removal (the standard structured LTH) hardly become winning tickets.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has significantly advanced the reasoning capabilities of large language models, yet how to explicitly steer training toward exploration or exploitation remains an open problem. We introduce Token Hidden Reward (THR), a token-level metric that quantifies each token's influence on the likelihood of correct responses under Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We find that training dynamics are dominated by a small subset of tokens with high absolute THR values. Most interestingly, tokens with positive THR strengthen confidence in correct outputs, thus favoring exploitation, while tokens with negative THR preserve probability mass for alternative outputs, enabling exploration. This insight suggests a natural intervention: a THR-guided reweighting algorithm that modulates GRPO's learning signals to explicitly bias training toward exploitation or exploration. We validate the efficacy of this algorithm on diverse math reasoning benchmarks. By amplifying tokens with positive THR value and weakening negative ones, our algorithm improves greedy-decoding accuracy, favoring exploitation. The reverse strategy yields consistent gains in Pass@K accuracy, favoring exploration. We further demonstrate that our algorithm integrates seamlessly with other RL objectives such as GSPO and generalizes across architectures including Llama. These findings establish THR as a principled and fine-grained mechanism for dynamically controlling exploration and exploitation in RL-tuned LLMs, providing new tools for targeted fine-tuning in reasoning-intensive applications.

Sequential learning with feedback graphs is a natural extension of the multi-armed bandit problem where the problem is equipped with an underlying graph structure that provides additional information - playing an action reveals the losses of all the neighbors of the action. This problem was introduced by mannor2011 and received considerable attention in recent years. It is generally stated in the literature that the minimax regret rate for this problem is of order alpha T, where alpha is the independence number of the graph, and T is the time horizon. However, this is proven only when the number of rounds T is larger than alpha^3, which poses a significant restriction for the usability of this result in large graphs. In this paper, we define a new quantity R^*, called the problem complexity, and prove that the minimax regret is proportional to R^* for any graph and time horizon T. Introducing an intricate exploration strategy, we define the \mainAlgorithm algorithm that achieves the minimax optimal regret bound and becomes the first provably optimal algorithm for this setting, even if T is smaller than alpha^3.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

Recent studies have shown that episodic reinforcement learning (RL) is no harder than bandits when the total reward is bounded by 1, and proved regret bounds that have a polylogarithmic dependence on the planning horizon H. However, it remains an open question that if such results can be carried over to adversarial RL, where the reward is adversarially chosen at each episode. In this paper, we answer this question affirmatively by proposing the first horizon-free policy search algorithm. To tackle the challenges caused by exploration and adversarially chosen reward, our algorithm employs (1) a variance-uncertainty-aware weighted least square estimator for the transition kernel; and (2) an occupancy measure-based technique for the online search of a stochastic policy. We show that our algorithm achieves an Obig((d+log (|S|^2 |A|))Kbig) regret with full-information feedback, where d is the dimension of a known feature mapping linearly parametrizing the unknown transition kernel of the MDP, K is the number of episodes, |S| and |A| are the cardinalities of the state and action spaces. We also provide hardness results and regret lower bounds to justify the near optimality of our algorithm and the unavoidability of log|S| and log|A| in the regret bound.

In this work, we study first-order algorithms for solving Bilevel Optimization (BO) where the objective functions are smooth but possibly nonconvex in both levels and the variables are restricted to closed convex sets. As a first step, we study the landscape of BO through the lens of penalty methods, in which the upper- and lower-level objectives are combined in a weighted sum with penalty parameter sigma > 0. In particular, we establish a strong connection between the penalty function and the hyper-objective by explicitly characterizing the conditions under which the values and derivatives of the two must be O(sigma)-close. A by-product of our analysis is the explicit formula for the gradient of hyper-objective when the lower-level problem has multiple solutions under minimal conditions, which could be of independent interest. Next, viewing the penalty formulation as O(sigma)-approximation of the original BO, we propose first-order algorithms that find an epsilon-stationary solution by optimizing the penalty formulation with sigma = O(epsilon). When the perturbed lower-level problem uniformly satisfies the small-error proximal error-bound (EB) condition, we propose a first-order algorithm that converges to an epsilon-stationary point of the penalty function, using in total O(epsilon^{-3}) and O(epsilon^{-7}) accesses to first-order (stochastic) gradient oracles when the oracle is deterministic and oracles are noisy, respectively. Under an additional assumption on stochastic oracles, we show that the algorithm can be implemented in a fully {\it single-loop} manner, i.e., with O(1) samples per iteration, and achieves the improved oracle-complexity of O(epsilon^{-3}) and O(epsilon^{-5}), respectively.

There is a strong link between the general concept of intelligence and the ability to collect and use information. The theory of Bayes-adaptive exploration offers an attractive optimality framework for training machines to perform complex information gathering tasks. However, the computational complexity of the resulting optimal control problem has limited the diffusion of the theory to mainstream deep AI research. In this paper we exploit the inherent mathematical structure of Bayes-adaptive problems in order to dramatically simplify the problem by making the reward structure denser while simultaneously decoupling the learning of exploitation and exploration policies. The key to this simplification comes from the novel concept of cross-value (i.e. the value of being in an environment while acting optimally according to another), which we use to quantify the value of currently available information. This results in a new denser reward structure that "cashes in" all future rewards that can be predicted from the current information state. In a set of experiments we show that the approach makes it possible to learn challenging information gathering tasks without the use of shaping and heuristic bonuses in situations where the standard RL algorithms fail.

We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Such cost to serve analysis has application both strategically and operationally in transportation. The problem is formally given by the traveling salesperson game (TSG), a cooperative total utility game in which agents correspond to locations in a traveling salesperson problem (TSP). The cost to serve a location is an allocated portion of the cost of an optimal tour. The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative games, giving a principled and fair allocation both for the TSG and more generally. We consider a number of direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value, and present the first proof that approximating the Shapley value of the TSG within a constant factor is NP-hard. Treating the Shapley value as an ideal baseline allocation, we then develop six proxies for that value which are relatively easy to compute. We perform an experimental evaluation using Synthetic Euclidean games as well as games derived from real-world tours calculated for fast-moving consumer goods scenarios. Our experiments show that several computationally tractable allocation techniques correspond to good proxies for the Shapley value.

We consider a resource-aware variant of the classical multi-armed bandit problem: In each round, the learner selects an arm and determines a resource limit. It then observes a corresponding (random) reward, provided the (random) amount of consumed resources remains below the limit. Otherwise, the observation is censored, i.e., no reward is obtained. For this problem setting, we introduce a measure of regret, which incorporates the actual amount of allocated resources of each learning round as well as the optimality of realizable rewards. Thus, to minimize regret, the learner needs to set a resource limit and choose an arm in such a way that the chance to realize a high reward within the predefined resource limit is high, while the resource limit itself should be kept as low as possible. We propose a UCB-inspired online learning algorithm, which we analyze theoretically in terms of its regret upper bound. In a simulation study, we show that our learning algorithm outperforms straightforward extensions of standard multi-armed bandit algorithms.

By incorporating regret minimization, double oracle methods have demonstrated rapid convergence to Nash Equilibrium (NE) in normal-form games and extensive-form games, through algorithms such as online double oracle (ODO) and extensive-form double oracle (XDO), respectively. In this study, we further examine the theoretical convergence rate and sample complexity of such regret minimization-based double oracle methods, utilizing a unified framework called Regret-Minimizing Double Oracle. Based on this framework, we extend ODO to extensive-form games and determine its sample complexity. Moreover, we demonstrate that the sample complexity of XDO can be exponential in the number of information sets |S|, owing to the exponentially decaying stopping threshold of restricted games. To solve this problem, we propose the Periodic Double Oracle (PDO) method, which has the lowest sample complexity among all existing double oracle methods, being only polynomial in |S|. Empirical evaluations on multiple poker and board games show that PDO achieves significantly faster convergence than previous double oracle algorithms and reaches a competitive level with state-of-the-art regret minimization methods.

We seek to understand fundamental tradeoffs between the accuracy of prior information that a learner has on a given problem and its learning performance. We introduce the notion of prioritized risk, which differs from traditional notions of minimax and Bayes risk by allowing us to study such fundamental tradeoffs in settings where reality does not necessarily conform to the learner's prior. We present a general reduction-based approach for extending classical minimax lower-bound techniques in order to lower bound the prioritized risk for statistical estimation problems. We also introduce a novel generalization of Fano's inequality (which may be of independent interest) for lower bounding the prioritized risk in more general settings involving unbounded losses. We illustrate the ability of our framework to provide insights into tradeoffs between prior information and learning performance for problems in estimation, regression, and reinforcement learning.

In this paper, we present improved learning-augmented algorithms for the multi-option ski rental problem. Learning-augmented algorithms take ML predictions as an added part of the input and incorporates these predictions in solving the given problem. Due to their unique strength that combines the power of ML predictions with rigorous performance guarantees, they have been extensively studied in the context of online optimization problems. Even though ski rental problems are one of the canonical problems in the field of online optimization, only deterministic algorithms were previously known for multi-option ski rental, with or without learning augmentation. We present the first randomized learning-augmented algorithm for this problem, surpassing previous performance guarantees given by deterministic algorithms. Our learning-augmented algorithm is based on a new, provably best-possible randomized competitive algorithm for the problem. Our results are further complemented by lower bounds for deterministic and randomized algorithms, and computational experiments evaluating our algorithms' performance improvements.

We consider online learning in multi-player smooth monotone games. Existing algorithms have limitations such as (1) being only applicable to strongly monotone games; (2) lacking the no-regret guarantee; (3) having only asymptotic or slow O(1{T}) last-iterate convergence rate to a Nash equilibrium. While the O(1{T}) rate is tight for a large class of algorithms including the well-studied extragradient algorithm and optimistic gradient algorithm, it is not optimal for all gradient-based algorithms. We propose the accelerated optimistic gradient (AOG) algorithm, the first doubly optimal no-regret learning algorithm for smooth monotone games. Namely, our algorithm achieves both (i) the optimal O(T) regret in the adversarial setting under smooth and convex loss functions and (ii) the optimal O(1{T}) last-iterate convergence rate to a Nash equilibrium in multi-player smooth monotone games. As a byproduct of the accelerated last-iterate convergence rate, we further show that each player suffers only an O(log T) individual worst-case dynamic regret, providing an exponential improvement over the previous state-of-the-art O(T) bound.

Motivated by the need to efficiently identify multiple candidates in high trial-and-error cost tasks such as drug discovery, we propose a near-optimal algorithm to identify all ε-best arms (i.e., those at most ε worse than the optimum). Specifically, we introduce LinFACT, an algorithm designed to optimize the identification of all ε-best arms in linear bandits. We establish a novel information-theoretic lower bound on the sample complexity of this problem and demonstrate that LinFACT achieves instance optimality by matching this lower bound up to a logarithmic factor. A key ingredient of our proof is to integrate the lower bound directly into the scaling process for upper bound derivation, determining the termination round and thus the sample complexity. We also extend our analysis to settings with model misspecification and generalized linear models. Numerical experiments, including synthetic and real drug discovery data, demonstrate that LinFACT identifies more promising candidates with reduced sample complexity, offering significant computational efficiency and accelerating early-stage exploratory experiments.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

Performing Reinforcement Learning in sparse rewards settings, with very little prior knowledge, is a challenging problem since there is no signal to properly guide the learning process. In such situations, a good search strategy is fundamental. At the same time, not having to adapt the algorithm to every single problem is very desirable. Here we introduce TAXONS, a Task Agnostic eXploration of Outcome spaces through Novelty and Surprise algorithm. Based on a population-based divergent-search approach, it learns a set of diverse policies directly from high-dimensional observations, without any task-specific information. TAXONS builds a repertoire of policies while training an autoencoder on the high-dimensional observation of the final state of the system to build a low-dimensional outcome space. The learned outcome space, combined with the reconstruction error, is used to drive the search for new policies. Results show that TAXONS can find a diverse set of controllers, covering a good part of the ground-truth outcome space, while having no information about such space.

Interference is ubiquitous when conducting causal experiments over networks. Except for certain network structures, causal inference on the network in the presence of interference is difficult due to the entanglement between the treatment assignments and the interference levels. In this article, we conduct causal inference under interference on an observed, sparse but connected network, and we propose a novel design of experiments based on an independent set. Compared to conventional designs, the independent-set design focuses on an independent subset of data and controls their interference exposures through the assignments to the rest (auxiliary set). We provide a lower bound on the size of the independent set from a greedy algorithm , and justify the theoretical performance of estimators under the proposed design. Our approach is capable of estimating both spillover effects and treatment effects. We justify its superiority over conventional methods and illustrate the empirical performance through simulations.